Jurisdiction of Trial Court to Cancel Apex Court Bail: Supreme Court Clarifies in CBI v. Vinay Kulkarni 

Introduction 

In the matter of State of Karnataka v. Vinay Rajashekharappa Kulkarni, the Supreme Court of India addressed an important procedural question concerning the maintainability of a bail cancellation application filed under s. 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) read with s. 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) by the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’). The issue before the Court was whether a Sessions Court could entertain an application for cancellation of bail when the original bail was granted by the Supreme Court itself. The decision gains significance in the context of balancing the hierarchy of judicial authority with the practical enforcement of bail conditions. 

Brief Facts 

The case arose out of the murder of one Yogesh Goudar, a member of the Zilla Panchayat, Dharwad. A First Information Report (‘FIR’) was registered in 2016 under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) against unknown persons. A charge sheet was filed against six individuals, and a trial commenced in Sessions Case No. 50/2017. Later, the Government of Karnataka handed over the case to the CBI, which re-registered the FIR and arraigned several more accused, including the Respondent, Vinay Rajashekharappa Kulkarni, a former minister. 

The Respondent was arrested by the CBI in November 2020. His bail applications before the Trial Court and the High Court were dismissed. However, in August 2021, the Supreme Court granted bail to him while laying down certain conditions, including that the Respondent shall not contact witnesses, impede the trial, enter Dharwad, and must mark attendance with the CBI twice a week. 

In December 2024, the CBI filed an application before the Trial Court seeking cancellation of bail of the Respondent and a co-accused, citing attempts to influence key prosecution witnesses. While the Trial Court cancelled the bail of the co-accused, it refused to entertain the application against the Respondent, holding that it lacked jurisdiction since bail had been granted by the Supreme Court. 

Held 

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the facts and submissions of both parties, held that the Trial Court had erred in law by refusing to entertain the CBI’s application for cancellation of bail on the ground of maintainability. The Court clarified that even though bail was granted by the Supreme Court in 2021, the Trial Court had been expressly authorised to impose conditions and therefore retained the jurisdiction to oversee compliance and enforce those conditions. Referring to its earlier decision in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration)ⁱ, the Court reaffirmed the principle that lower courts are not precluded from considering applications for cancellation of bail, even when the original bail was granted by a superior court. 

The Court further noted that there was sufficient prima facie material on record—such as call detail records (CDRs), CCTV footage, and evidence of a witness retracting a statement to indicate that the Respondent had attempted to contact or influence key prosecution witnesses. Such conduct constituted a violation of the bail conditions specifically imposed to prevent tampering with evidence or interfering with the investigation and trial. In view of this, the Supreme Court concluded that the bail granted to the Respondent was liable to be cancelled. It accordingly directed the Respondent to surrender within one week and instructed the Trial Court to conclude the trial expeditiously, without being influenced by any observations made in the order. 

Our Analysis  

This judgment is a significant reaffirmation of judicial control over bail compliance, particularly in high-profile criminal cases involving allegations of witness tampering. The Supreme Court rightly underscored that the procedural authority to cancel bail is not confined by the hierarchy of courts. When a constitutional court grants bail with express directions that the trial court may impose and monitor conditions, the logical extension is that the trial court retains the power to act on breaches of those conditions. This not only ensures procedural efficiency but also prevents a vacuum in enforcement, which could be exploited by influential individuals. 

Importantly, the Court’s reasoning aligns with broader principles of criminal jurisprudence, where the liberty granted under bail is conditional upon good conduct and non-interference with the judicial process. The evidentiary standard for cancelling bail is necessarily different from that required for conviction. The material placed on record such as witness intimidation through intermediaries and technological evidence like CDRs and CCTV footage justified the inference that the Respondent had violated the express terms of his bail. The fact that an approver retracted his statement under suspicious circumstances further strengthened the CBI’s case for cancellation. 

The ruling also showcases the Court’s commitment to upholding the rule of law in politically sensitive cases. By cancelling the bail of a former minister, the Court sent a strong signal that no individual, regardless of status or influence, is above the law. The inclusion of s. 483(3) of the BNSS in place of the older CrPC provision also marks a seamless transition in procedural law, while reinforcing the continuity of jurisprudential principles under the new legal framework. 

Moreover, this case highlights the judiciary’s role in ensuring that bail conditions are not reduced to mere formalities. The Court effectively emphasized that trial courts are not powerless or subordinate in the enforcement of such conditions, even if the bail was originally granted by the Supreme Court. This ensures that accountability is maintained at every level of the criminal justice system. 

In conclusion, the judgment of this case provides much-needed clarity on the jurisdiction of courts in bail cancellation matters and reinforces the foundational principle that bail is a conditional privilege, not an unfettered right. It stands as a vital precedent to ensure that procedural safeguards are not undermined by undue deference to hierarchy, especially where interference with justice is credibly alleged. 

Authored by Ascend Legal Editorial Team. The opinions expressed are personal and do not constitute any legal advocacy.